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RECENT CASE

CRIMINAL LAW-DOUBLE JEOPARDY-PROHIBIT1ON
FOR GREATER OFFENCE AFTER CONVICTION ON LESSER

AGAINST SECOND TRIAL

CHARGE-Everett Green

was tried by jury in the District of Columbia upon an indictment charging arson
and first degree murder. The jury found Green guilty of arson and second degree
murder, but their verdict was silent as to the first degree murder charge. After
judgment on this verdict, Green appealed the murder conviction and obtained a
reversal by the Court of Appeals because of insufficient evidence. Green was again
tried on remand to the trial court under the original indictment. His defence of
double jeopardy was overruled and the jury found him guilty of murder in the
first degree. A mandatory death sentence was imposed and Green again appealed.
The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court, with four Justices dissenting,
held that Green's constitutional right to protection against double jeopardy under
the Fifth Amendment had been violated and reversed the conviction. Green v.
United States, 78 Sup. Ct. 221, 2 Led. 2d 199 (U.S. 1957).
In reaching this conclusion, Mr. Justice Black, writing for the Court, carefully examined the varied reasoning and precedents concerning the defense of
double jeopardy. The theories that an appeal by a defendant from a criminal
conviction "waives" the defense of double jeopardy or that jeopardy continues
throughout the trial, appeal and new trial were not found to be acceptable. This
opinion adopts the theory that a conviction for a lesser included offense implies
an acquittal as to the greater offense in the indictment and that therefore no new
trial upon the greater charge may be allowed to follow an appeal from such a
verdict.
The conclusion reached by this decision has its basis in the early English
Rule, once held in this country, that no new trial could be granted after a verdict
resulting in either an acquittal or a conviction, since this would constitute double
jeopardy or hazard. United States v. Gibert, 25 Fed. Cas. 1287, No. 15,204 (C.C.
Mass. 1834). Five years later this rule was rejected by the Indiana Circuit, which
modified it to allow a new trial when requested by a defendant. United States v.
Keen, 26 Fed. Cas. 686, No. 15,510 (C.C. Ind. 1839). However it was still maintained that a verdict of acquittal could not be set aside by any court. A similar
holding followed in 1871, which rested upon the opinion that no double jeopardy
ensued in an appeal taken by a defendant, since by his voluntary request for a
new trial, he has attempted to relieve himself of his present jeopardy and encounters only this same hazard and not a new one. United States v. Harding, 26 Fed.
Cas. 131, No. 15,301 (C.C. Tenn. 1871).
While it is recognized that a few states do allow appeals by the prosecution
after acquittal or conviction, the federal rule is that no criminal case can be
appealed by the Government upon a writ of error, but only upon a certificate of
division of opinion by a lower tribunal. United States v. Sanges, 144 U.S. 310
(1892). Appeals are held to be limited to the defense on the ground that an
appeal by the prosecution would violate the prohibition against double jeopardy.
U. S. CONST. amend. V; United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896). The deeplyrooted criminal law principle which prohibits an appeal from a verdict of acquittal
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has again been recognized by the Supreme Court in a recent decision. Peters v.
Hobby, 349 U.S. 331,344 (1955).
A case which arose in the Philippine Islands is the only previous instance in
which the precise double jeopardy problems of the principal case squarely faced
the Court. Trono v. United States, 199 US. 521 (1905). The defendant had
been acquitted of murder and convicted of assault. Upon his appeal, the Supreme
Court of the Philippine Islands reversed the trial court and convicted him of
homicide. The Supreme Court affirmed this ruling on the grounds that the defendant had waived his former jeopardy by appeal and had no right to limit this
waiver by relying on the previous acquittal. Such reasoning seems to stretch the
theory of waiver, particularly in view of a later Supreme Court definition: "A
waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known
right or privilege." Johnson V. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458,464 (1938).
The Trono decision was preceded in the Philippines by another case in which
the government appealed an acquittal, which resulted in a conviction by the appellate court. In this case, as in Trono, the Court held that the Statute [32 STAT.
691 (1902)] relating to the Islands adopted the double jeopardy clause of the
United States Constitution which guarantees freedom from retrial for the same
offense after an acquittal. Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100 (1903). It is
interesting to note that Mr. Justice Holmes filed a dissent in this earlier case,
asserting that the statutory right of appeal by the government continued the initial
jeopardy and could not create a new peril to the defendant. In the Trono case,
Holmes concurred in the result, but without comment. So far it appears that no
decision of the Supreme Court has been based upon this theory of continuing
jeopardy, which is expressly rejected in the instant case. In a third case arising in
the Philippine Islands, Mr. Justice Holmes, writing for the Court, flatly followed
the Trono decision and held that the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands could
lawfully increase the sentence of a defendant upon his appeal. Flemister v. United
States, 207 U.S. 372 (1907). For a similar case, see United States v. Gonzales, 206
F. 239 (W.D. Wash. 1913).
The theory upheld by the Court in the case at hand was expressly denied in
1928, when it was decided that a conviction of manslaughter was not an acquittal
of murder as set forth in the indictment. Carbonell v. People of Porto Rico, 27
F. 2d 253 (1st Cir. 1928). This court also added that its decision was made in the
light of an interpretation of double jeopardy as framed in the Fifth Amendment.
It is generally held that no double jeopardy necessarily ensues when an appeal is
taken by a defendant in a federal court. If error is found, the defendant may be
retried without violating his constitutional rights. Bryan v. United States, 338
U.S. 552 (1950); United States v. Ball, supra. Such a result was held although
upon retrial the jury failed to recommend mercy in a conviction for murder in
the first degree. This was explained on the theory that the conviction was identical
in each trial, although the punishment was mitigated by the jury only after the first.
Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S. 15 (1919).
Normally a defendant is in legal jeopardy once he is placed on trial before a
jury. However, various reasons have been held sufficient to warrant the dismissal
of a jury without the defendant's consent and without barring a second trial.
Among these are bias of jury members [Simmons v. United States, 142 U.S. 148
(1891)]; failure to agree on a verdict [United States v. Perez, 9 Wheat. 579
(U.S. 1824)]; and emergency surgery required by the defendant during the course
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of the trial [United States v. Stein, 140 F. Supp. 761 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) ]. Such dismissals are entirely within the discretion of the trial judge and will not ordinarily
be reviewed by a higher court. United States v. Perez, supra. Similar rules have
developed in trials by court martial. Discontinuance of a trial due to movements
of an invading army has been held to be no bar to a second court martial by the
army moving into the occupied area. Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684 (1949).
A peculiar situation with respect to double jeopardy in court martial cases
arises from the fact that Article of War 40 [10 U.S.C. 1511] requires that the
members of the court and the reviewing officer must agree before sentence can be
executed. Under this provision it has been held that double jeopardy does not result
when a defendant is retried after the refusal of the commanding officer to give his
approval to the initial conviction. Brewster v. Swope, 180 F. 2d 984 (9th Cir.
1950). Such a proceeding is not a complete "trial" until approved. A more
lenient tendency in allowing second trials to stand has been exhibited by the
Supreme Court in the review of state court decisions. An early case recognized
the "implied acquittal" theory of the principal case where a defendant found
guilty of second degree murder was later convicted of first degree murder. Kring
v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221 (1882). In 1910, the contention that a defendant was
placed in double jeopardy by a retrial and conviction on a greater offense was
held to be "absolutely without merit." The Court added, "It was not a case of twice
in jeopardy under any view of the Constitution of the United States." Brantley v.
Georgia, 217 U.S. 284, 285 (1910).
An interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment regarding double jeopardy
was nebulously set forth by Mr. Justice Cardozo in 1937. Palko v. Connecticut, 302
U.S. 319 (1937). An appeal by the state which resulted in a conviction for a
greater offense than that of the original conviction was approved on the theory
that such double jeopardy was not a fundamental principle of liberty and justice
lying at the foundation of our civil and political institutions. This decision gave
a reciprocal right of appeal to the state after a trial containing error. Mr. Justice
Frankfurter attempted to further define the limits of state prosecution in a concurring opinion in a later case, in which he stated: A state falls short of its obligation when it callously subjects an individual to successive retrials on a charge on
which he has been acquitted or prevents a trial from proceeding to a termination
in favor of the accused merely in order to allow a prosecutor who has been incompetent or casual or even ineffective to see if he can do better a second time.
Brock v. North Carolina,344 U.S. 424, 429 (1953).
For a lengthy footnote listing state decisions allowing or rejecting retrial for
the greater offence, see the dissenting opinion of the principal case. Green v.
78 S. Ct. 221, 238-240 n. 4, 2 L. Ed. 2d 199, 220-222
United States, 355 U.S ....
n. 4 (1957).
It is hoped that at least a part of the confusion evident from these federal
decisions will be cleared away as a result of the holding in the principal case.
Justice seems to require certainty in criminal convictions, and reopening counts of
an indictment once closed by jury trial seems too great a price to pay for the right
of appeal. A later decision extending a like construction of double jeopardy to
trials in state courts and courts martial would be altogether desirable and might
well result from the present zealous desire of the Supreme Court to safeguard civil
and human rights.
RICHARD J. ST. JOHN

